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At the end of February, President Alvaro Arzu reopened negotiations with the Guatemalan
guerrillas. At the first meeting held in Mexico Feb. 22-23 all sides expressed nearly unprecedented
optimism about the prospect of a final peace accord being signed before the end of 1996. Still,
extremely difficult issues must yet be worked out at the bargaining table, including the current
agenda item under discussion, socioeconomic and agrarian issues. Those matters have aroused
fierce opposition among extreme-right members of the private sector and the army, snagging
progress in the peace talks since April 1995. Under former president Ramiro de Leon's government,
substantial progress took place in the peace process, which has been underway for seven years.
During his time in office, de Leon signed four accords with the guerrillas, who are grouped in the
umbrella Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG): a comprehensive accord on
human rights; an agreement to ensure the safe return of refugees in Mexico and elsewhere; an
accord on the rights of indigenous peoples of Guatemala; and a pact authorizing the establishment
of a war-crimes commission to investigate abuses committed by both sides during the 36-year war
(see NotiSur, 03/03/95 and 04/07/95). In addition to the current issues under discussion, four points
are still pending: measures to fortify civilian power and redefine the army's role in the country;
constitutional reforms and changes in the electoral system; the terms for a final cease-fire; and a
calendar for the URNG's reincorporation into civilian life combined with verification measures to
guarantee that all accords are respected.
The two sides began negotiating the socioeconomic and agrarian issues in April 1995, with 10 key
points for discussion placed on the bargaining table (see NotiSur, 08/18/95). Some progress took
place in the talks, which were divided into four broad areas: agrarian affairs; public services and
social welfare; the role of the state in the economy; and the country's tax structure and fiscal policies.
But by mid-1995, the talks snagged over the thorny issues of land and tax reforms proposed by the
guerrillas. Negotiations continued during the second half of the year, but with general elections set
for November 1995 and the political campaign in full swing, little further progress was achieved. The
last round of talks took place on Dec. 15, when both sides agreed to suspend the meetings until after
a new government was sworn in on Jan. 14.
In his inaugural address, President Arzu promised to make the peace negotiations a top priority
of his government, and he predicted that a final agreement to end the war could be reached
within seven or eight months (see NotiSur, 02/22/96). "Nothing and nobody will be able to block
the advance of the peace process," said Arzu. Still, no visible progress took place during Arzu's
first month in office. However, the government announced it was restructuring the official peace
commission (Comision para la Paz, COPAZ), which until then had acted as the sole negotiating body
for the government. In late January, Hector Rosada head of COPAZ under ex- president de Leon
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resigned from the Commission, paving the way for the incoming administration to appoint a new
COPAZ director and five other delegates, which, under COPAZ's statutes, must include three army
officers.
Given the Arzu administration's delay in naming the new delegates, combined with the lack of any
official statement on the reopening of negotiations, concerns increased that the new government
might be moving peace talks to the back burner. Nevertheless, in mid-February, the government
announced a broad new policy initiative aimed at reinvigorating the entire peace process, and which
could, in turn, accelerate negotiations on the issues still pending at the bargaining table. First, the
government revealed that, since December, Arzu and his closest collaborators have held five "secret
meetings" with the URNG, which began even before Arzu won the second round of elections on Jan.
7.
The meetings were aimed at reviewing the issues still pending, while at the same time building
confidence among the participants to pave the way for rapid progress once Arzu took office. Arzu
personally met with the URNG directorate in El Salvador in December. Second, the government
announced three new civilian appointees to COPAZ, and, at the same time, said that the Foreign
Ministry would begin to play an active role in the negotiations for the first time. Although COPAZ
will remain in charge of direct negotiations with the URNG, the Foreign Ministry will oversee the
creation of a new commission Secretaria de la Paz (SEPAZ) which will oversee all "administrative"
matters related to the peace process. Under de Leon, both the political and administrative
responsibilities were concentrated in COPAZ.
In effect, by creating SEPAZ and simultaneously increasing the Foreign Ministry's role in the
negotiations, Arzu has decreased COPAZ's ability to act autonomously in the talks, giving
the executive and the president a much greater direct role in the process. That, in turn, could
substantially diminish the army's influence in the negotiations, since COPAZ includes three military
officers. Moreover, the new COPAZ appointees are expected to make the entire negotiating process
move more smoothly given their "moderate" stance on economic and political issues. The new head
of COPAZ, Gustavo Porras, is a former guerrilla who, in the late 1970s, participated in the Ejercito
Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), one of the four rebel groups included in the URNG.
Porras lived in exile throughout the 1980s, during which time he broke away from the EGP and
helped found a splinter faction called Octubre Revolucionario (OR). Since the early 1990s, many
OR members have returned to the country to reintegrate into civilian life, including Porras, who
became an influential member of PAN and a close Arzu collaborator. In addition to Porras, Arzu
appointed Richard Atkinhead and Raquel Zelaya as members of COPAZ. Both are former ministers
of finance who are well-respected throughout the private sector. Both are also considered moderates
who represent the modernizing sector of the business community that favors a negotiated end to
the war and the fortification of democratic structures in the country. And, in the Foreign Ministry,
Arzu appointed two well- known leftists Eduardo Stein and Gabriel Aguilera as minister and vice
minister, respectively. According to some media reports, conservative members of the business
community pressured Arzu to throw Stein, Aguilera, and Porras out of the government, which
allegedly led to the delay in setting up COPAZ and SEPAZ.
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In the end, Atkinhead and Zelaya may have been appointed to COPAZ to assuage fears among
business associations that Porras and the Foreign Ministry officials would cave into guerrilla
demands in the negotiations. Against that backdrop, the government announced the first round of
formal negotiations for Feb. 22-23. No conclusive agreements were reached at the meeting, since
the encounter was aimed at setting up a calendar for talks throughout the year and agreeing on the
terms and conditions of future meetings.
Among other things, both sides agreed to meet again in the second half of March, but they also
stressed that they would not set deadlines for concluding the pending agenda items to avoid
creating false expectations among the public. Then, on Feb. 26, President Arzu met with the URNG
leadership in Mexico City during an official two-day trip to that country. Although Arzu had
met with the rebel leaders when he was still a candidate, his willingness to meet face- to-face
with the guerrillas as president set a historic precedent, since no former head of state had even
considered meeting the URNG directorate save for possibly at the signing of a final peace accord.
The reopening of negotiations and Arzu's bold initiative spurred widespread optimism regarding
the future of negotiations.
"[The meeting] signals a historic new phase in the peace process," said EGP head Rolando Moran
after the encounter with Arzu. "It is a step forward in the talks and in the process of drawing
closer and living together." Arzu as well expressed his satisfaction after the meeting. "For me, the
magic word is 'confidence,' and by meeting directly with the guerrilla leaders we managed to tear
down the barriers that have created a lack of confidence. We are trying to pave the way for a final
peace accord as soon as possible, and I think this meeting provided a great deal of impetus in that
direction."
Even before the latest meetings in Mexico, the URNG was already more upbeat than at any time
before about the chances for a final accord this year. In early February, Rodrigo Asturias leader of
the Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), another of the four member organizations of the
URNG stated emphatically that the guerrillas are determined to join the legal political process.
"The most important thing now is to build a political force that can take over when we put down
the weapons," said Asturias, more generally known by his nom de guerre, Gaspar Llom. "The old
power structures in Guatemala have not changed and, for the time being, we need to keep our
military might in reserve. We won't support any ambitious deadlines because that could sidetrack
the process. Still, we believe it might be possible to find a peaceful solution within eight months."
Asturias said that, given the progress achieved so far in the secret talks since December and the
formal meeting in late February, the URNG believes an accord on socioeconomic issues could be
signed by April. "We are very optimistic," said Asturias on Feb. 24. "There are still difficult issues
ahead, such as the strengthening of civil society and the army's role, but we are confident that
there will be rapid progress." Still, notwithstanding the optimism, the two sides must hammer out
concrete agreements on the issues, some of which continue to evoke fierce opposition among the
most conservative members of the private sector and the army.
In fact, one of the most recalcitrant private-sector organizations the Coordinadora Nacional
Agropecuaria (CONAGRO) tried to derail the entire peace process in late 1995 because the
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guerrillas' demands for land and tax reforms in the current negotiations inflamed tensions among
the country's large landowners. CONAGRO initiated court proceedings against the state for
negotiating accords with the guerrillas that allegedly breach the Constitution. The group also
opened criminal suits against former head of COPAZ Hector Rosada and the other members of the
commission who worked with him for unconstitutionally usurping legal powers in their negotiations
with the guerrillas.
The Constitutional Court (CC) is still reviewing the suits, but it has already granted an injunction
in favor of COPAZ and its members to allow the peace process to proceed while the court cases
are resolved. The adamant opposition by CONAGRO and other extreme-right groups managed
to halt all progress in negotiations in the final months of the de Leon government, according
to Rosada. "The fact is that the firm opposition to the signing of any accord on the issues being
discussed derailed the talks," said Rosada. "We have to watch very closely now to see if the new
government takes any steps backward on what we agreed on in the talks last year. The question
is, will the new government have the ability to resist the pressures of the economic powers that
be?" [Sources: Cerigua News Briefs (Guatemala), 11/30/95, 01/04/96, 02/01/96; La Nacion (Costa
Rica), 02/03/96; Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 09/21/95, 10/05/95, 10/26/95, 11/02/95,
11/23/95, 11/30/95, 01/11/96, 01/25/96, 02/01/96, 02/08/96, 02/15/96; Notimex, 02/13/96, 02/20/96;
Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias- Spanish news service EFE, 01/13-15/96, 01/18/96, 01/19/96,
01/23/96, 01/24-26/96, 02/03/96, 02/08/96, 02/13/96, 02/14/96, 02/17/96, 02/20/96, 02/22-24/96; Inter
Press Service, 01/16/96, 02/05/96, 02/12/96, 02/21/96, 02/22/96, 02/24/96; Reuter, 01/12/96, 01/16/96,
01/17/96, 02/02/96, 02/03/96, 02/05/96, 02/06/96, 02/09/96, 02/12/96, 02/15/96, 02/21-24/96, 02/26/96;
Agence France-Presse, 01/10/96, 01/18/96, 01/25/96, 01/27/96, 01/31/96, 02/01/96, 02/04/96, 02/06/96,
02/08/96, 02/09/96, 02/11/96, 02/14/96, 02/15/96, 02/20-22/96, 02/24/96, 02/26/96, 02/27/96]
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